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RF: This is a very broad question, but I think it will 
help lay a foundation for the rest of the discussion. How
do developing economies differ from developed
economies? Are there some attributes of the latter that
are typically lacking in the former?  
Calvo: You could make a very long list of differences, but
the ones that I think are most important and that have 
captured my attention have to do with the financial sector.
There is often market incompleteness, which means that
many countries have to borrow in terms of foreign exchange
denominated bonds. There is also imperfection with 
domestic capital markets. In particular, there is often poor
protection of credit, which makes people suspicious that
there will be a devaluation or confiscation. That can lead to
bank runs. So these two things seem to play a central role in
developing countries. 
Now, one might wonder whether the institutions are so
different from developed countries or whether the shocks
are different, because the relative price changes are much
wider? If the United States were subject to those kind of
shocks, perhaps there would be the same type of political
pressure that we see in developing countries, and that would
affect the structure of institutions. It’s very difficult to tell.
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Why are some countries rich and others poor? 
It’s perhaps the most important question in all of 
economics. Although many economists have tried 
to answer it and much progress has been made, there
are still many issues that are unclear. Latin America 
provides a good case study. While a few countries, 
such as Chile, have experienced steady rates of eco-
nomic growth for many years, the region as a whole
still lags well behind the developed world in standards
of living. Moreover, other countries have continued to
suffer large financial shocks, which have introduced
volatility in their economic and political institutions.
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of exchange rate regimes for developing countries.
Could you please discuss why that choice should
depend, at least in part, on the characteristics of a 
country’s economy?
Calvo: Consider heavily dollar-
ized economies. It’s very difficult
to have a floating exchange rate
because balance sheets are mis-
matched in terms of currency
denomination. Let’s take the
example of Bolivia. Eighty per-
cent of deposits in the banking
sector are denominated in dollars.
Those loans go mostly to the pri-
vate sector, denominated in
dollars, and therefore if you were
to devalue all of a sudden, you
would have a financial crisis. So I think the financial charac-
teristics of an economy play a large role in determining its
exchange rate policy. 
Now, in general, markets are seriously incomplete in
developing countries. You have structures that are not very
reliable and you have poorly functioning futures markets.
That makes it difficult for the policymaker. It’s very risky to
float. As a consequence, developing countries, whether they
like it or not, tend to peg. I’m not saying that pegging is opti-
mal, but it’s a system that, at least in the short run, does not
interfere very much with the working of the economy and,
thus, it becomes appealing to the policymaker.
There are exceptions to this as you noted in the question.
Some developing countries have adopted floating exchange
rates with some success. But this is because they have
already developed the appropriate financial institutions. 
RF: How important is the choice of an exchange rate
regime relative to other macroeconomic policy choices?
Calvo: My answer may sound a bit paradoxical. On the one
hand, as I have said, the choice of exchange rate policies is
heavily dependent on institutions; it is not much of an 
independent policy variable. On the other hand, it is a very
critical variable. For countries to grow, at least for develop-
ing countries, exports are key. It’s very difficult to find an
example where exports are not the driving force. The
exchange rate can be thought as of a bridge between the
domestic and international economy. Exports have to go
over that bridge, and if exchange rates are highly volatile and
noncredible, coupled with incomplete futures markets, 
the life of the exporter can be very difficult. That will have
negative effects on trade and, consequently, on growth.
RF: The import-substitution model was quite popular
in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Why do you
think that was the case?
Calvo: It catered to the domestic producers and it also
promised to lessen income inequality, which is a big problem
in Latin America. So it was popular for those reasons. The
period in which those policies were implemented also hap-
pened to be a period of relatively
high growth for the region. So if
you just look at the numbers and
don’t do any deep analysis, you
may reach the conclusion that
high growth was a result of
import substitution.
By the early 1980s, opinion
changed and the conventional
wisdom said that the model was
exhausted. I’m not so sure that
was the case. The region is very
sensitive to external credit condi-
tions, and during the early 1980s
interest rates were going through
the roof. So this led to some very serious problems in Latin
America. But the simple-minded analysis concluded that the
model was exhausted, just as the simple-minded analysis
today says that the “Washington Consensus” is exhausted
because it, too, has experienced some problems. Our theory
is that there is a strong parallel between the two. While the
import-substitution model is not a system that I like, it may
be unfair to say that it simply had run its course and failed. It
was certainly vulnerable to shocks, to be sure, but any system
is vulnerable to shocks.
RF: You mentioned that income distribution is a 
problem in Latin America. Could you please elaborate
on that? For instance, is it slowing economic growth in
the region?
Calvo:The World Bank has done work that shows some evi-
dence of a link between inequality and slower economic
growth. I can imagine the mechanism: Inequality causes
political tension, which causes politicians to pursue policies
that cater to the poor by taxing capital, which induces capi-
tal flight, which lowers growth. Eventually, the situation gets
so bad that even left-of-center governments change policies
and adopt a more market-oriented approach. That works for
a while — you get increased growth but income distribution
deteriorates again. That’s the story and it seems to fit the
facts. If it’s true, then it’s a real trap. It’s not clear how you
get out of it.  
RF: How can policymakers in developing countries
effectively signal that they are committed to economic
reform? 
Calvo: I don’t think that there is a formula for that. I think
certain devices are useful, such as an independent central
bank. But that doesn’t mean it’s going to be a fail-safe solu-
tion because, in the final analysis, it can still be subject to
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I think many analysts may
overestimate the policy
changes occurring in
Latin America. I don’t see
the region, in general, as
veering off course.
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political pressure if the economy becomes very bad.
International agreements, such as the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), can also be useful. They can help estab-
lish credibility. But, again, the success of such agreements
depends on the political support that you can conjure up 
at home, both in adopting them and then complying 
with them.
RF: What is your opinion of central banks in developing
countries adopting inflation targets? 
Calvo: When developing countries adopt an inflation target
it’s usually because there is a lack of credibility. So they are
forced to stick to a system that is
very rigid. That has some benefits,
but it also makes it quite difficult to
deal with shocks and, unfortunately,
developing countries can experience
quite crippling shocks. For instance,
let’s say there is a financial shock and
you need to rescue the banking sec-
tor. The intense focus on controlling
inflation may make that very diffi-
cult. So an inflation target could
push the central bank toward 
pursuing policies that are counter-
productive and ultimately
unsustainable from a political point
of view. That’s why I cannot be too
excited about inflation targets in
developing countries. 
I should say that I’m also not a big
supporter of the United States
adopting an inflation target. There
have been cases, such as the period
immediately following the stock
market crash of 1987 and the collapse
of Long Term Capital Management
in 1998, where the Fed pursued 
policies that were good for the econ-
omy but that would have been
difficult to implement had it been committed to a rigid infla-
tion target.
RF: How would you rate Latin America’s efforts at
greater trade integration and openness?
Calvo: The 1990s was a period of trade liberalization. It’s
questionable whether that is sustainable. I am not particular-
ly optimistic. My hope was that something like the FTAA
would be ratified. Unfortunately, many countries seem to
have given up on the FTAAand instead are pursuing bilateral
trade agreements with the United States. That’s not very tidy.
One of the benefits of something like the FTAAwould be to
open up regional trade. There is not much trade going on
between Latin American countries now. So there are some
real opportunities that could be exploited even if trade with
the United States did not increase substantially. And, in that
context, it would be very useful to have a currency union.
Also, it goes beyond just trade. Latin America is a low
savings region, and in order to grow you need investment. So
if you are low savers, you need to attract foreign capital. 
That requires creating an attractive environment. I think
the FTAA would have helped move the region in that 
direction.
RF: You mentioned that a currency union would help
intra-regional trade. What’s your opinion of Latin
America adopting a currency union more generally?
Calvo:The jury is still out on how it
has worked in Europe. We don’t
know what is going to happen with
Italy or Portugal, for example,
where officials have been lax in their
enforcement of rules established by
the European Commission. I have
been a fan of currency unions for
some time, but my enthusiasm for
them has cooled off recently. I am
beginning to see many more poten-
tial difficulties with them now. 
A currency union requires 
commitment among the policymak-
ers in the member countries. In a
region that has typically had a lot of
political instability, politicians are
naturally inclined to give high 
priority to domestic issues. They
want to make sure that they are 
popular at home so that their 
governments do not come under
pressure from competing factions
or are toppled. This makes it 
difficult for many of them to credi-
bly commit to the type of policies
that are required by a currency
union. For instance, many will be unlikely to hit the fiscal
targets if that means they will risk domestic unpopularity. 
So I think it is a bit premature for Latin America to
adopt a currency union. But this doesn’t mean that the
region shouldn’t begin taking steps toward that goal. For
instance, Europe did not adopt its currency union
overnight. It took many years, indeed decades, to 
establish how the system was going to work and then to
implement it.
RF: Many South American countries seem to be under-
going an ideological shift. A number of leaders have
gained power running on an anti-Washington platform,
arguing that their countries should resist the type of
“neoliberal” policies favored by many in the develop-
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ment community. How widespread is this sentiment?
And how large of an obstacle does it pose for economic
growth and stability in the region? 
Calvo: I would say that it is more talk than action, at least
at the macro level. For instance, in Brazil, President Lula
said that he would not repay international loans, but now he
is making those payments, and implemented a fiscal 
program that is even tighter than the one agreed with the
IMF. There are some exceptions. And in some countries, it
is too early to tell whether the rhetoric we have heard 
will translate to big policy changes. But the majority of
countries are generally pursuing sound macroeconomic
policies, and I don’t anticipate that changing.
Now, it is true that there is a lot of talk in Latin America
about the “Washington Consensus” not working, and those
voices are joined by some prominent economists here in the
United States. My opinion is that the “Washington
Consensus” is really a misnomer. It is, for the most part, the
“Latin American Consensus” also. Most people agree that
the decalogue of policy proposals that are closely associat-
ed with it are reasonable and generally should be followed.
But it’s an incomplete list. For example, it does not 
adequately address how to reform the financial sector. We
need to work on those problems, but that doesn’t mean the
decalogue is itself bad or counterproductive. 
Also, I think it is important to mention the spread of
democracy during this period and the role it played. In
many parts of Latin America, democracy was a relatively
foreign concept. Then all of a sudden, the world opens up,
democracies are established, and politicians start making
promises to a populace that doesn’t understand democratic
politics and which takes those promises at face value. So
when the decalogue was proposed, some political leaders
both at home and abroad perhaps oversold what it would
mean for the region. When those things didn’t happen —
indeed, when there were severe financial crises — the pop-
ulace became skeptical of liberalization. Unfortunately, it
also led to skepticism about democracy. The public associ-
ated democracy with economic liberalization — and, in
their minds, those things brought instability and financial
trouble. That’s not how things actually worked, but the 
timing of events led them to believe it was true. 
So I don’t want to downplay the opposition that does
exist to the “Washington Consensus.” But, as I said 
before, I think that many analysts in the United States may
overestimate the policy changes that are occurring in Latin
America right now. I don’t see the region, in general, as
veering off course. 
RF: How do you account for some rather dramatic 
differences in economic performance within the
region? For instance, countries like Chile have been
relatively stable and grown relatively quickly, while
some of its neighbors have experienced significant and
persistent  problems.
Calvo: Actually, we have a paper comparing Chile with
Argentina and how they responded to the crisis of 1998.
Chile suffered from that crisis, but the implications for
Chile were very different than they were for Argentina. In
Argentina, the system shut down almost completely. In
Chile, the growth rate went from about 6 percent to zero,
but then it bounced back. One of the major reasons has to
do with differences in financial systems and institutions.
Chile wasn’t dollarized, while Argentina was and that
caused a whole host of problems. 
As for the broader question of Chile’s relative success in
the years leading up to the 1998 crisis and following it, I
think there are a number of factors at work. Chile, perhaps
more than the rest of the countries of South America, 
liberalized its trade policies and generally pursued market-
oriented reforms in the 1980s. On balance, these reforms
were beneficial to the economy. Also, Chile experienced
high rates of productivity growth. We are still uncertain
about all the causes of this productivity spurt — some of it
can probably be attributed to domestic policies, some of it
to positive shocks, such as exogenous technological
improvement — but whatever the causes, it’s clear that it
helped improve growth rates.
RF: Chile has a long history of American-trained 
economists advising the government. How common is
that in other Latin American countries?
Calvo: I would say that is now commonplace. The one
exception may be Argentina, where many of the American-
trained economists have left the government. Also, the
economists who are active often have quite important roles
in the policymaking process in Latin America, much more
so than in the United States. In addition, I think it is more
common for Latin American politicians to cross party lines
in seeking out economists for government positions.
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Other Path? What lessons can policymakers in Latin
America take from that book?
Calvo: The main lesson is that regulations must be 
simplified as much as possible in order to encourage the devel-
opment of the formal sector and, thus, most likely enhance the
pace of technical progress. However, I am skeptical that a major
overhaul of government regulations will have a major effect in
the short or medium term. The reason is that the informal sec-
tor strongly relies on tax evasion and, unless you implement a
major tax moratorium — accompanied by substantially lowered
tax rates —firms are likely not to move to the formal sector,
even if all the red tape is eliminated. Moreover, a moratorium is
likely to have detrimental moral hazard implications.
RF: Roughly 15 years after the fall of the Soviet bloc,
what have we learned about the transition from 
centrally planned to market economies? For instance, is
there an optimal way to sequence reforms?
Calvo: Optimal sequencing of reforms is a very complex issue
which transcends economics. My view is that it is essential for
politicians to get strong popular support.  This enhances the
credibility of reforms. Without credibility, even well-designed
and good policy reforms may turn out to be counterproductive.
This makes it difficult to extrapolate reforms in the Soviet bloc
to other regions, for instance, like China. Asudden dismantling
of state-owned firms in China, following the Soviet bloc pattern,
would seriously impair growth and social cohesion in China.
RF: Debt forgiveness has gotten a lot of attention
recently. What is your opinion?
Calvo: I think it raises real problems. It is one thing for the
developed world to make transfers to poor countries. If they
want to do that, fine. But it’s quite another for those countries
to make loans to poor countries and then when those countries
get in trouble because of bad policies, simply forgive the debt.
In those cases, you are simply pretending that you are lending
money and, in the process, you are allowing policymakers to
behave in a way that is not good for them. It’s bad for the coun-
try that is making the loan and it’s bad for the country that is
receiving it. The moral hazard issues here are quite severe and I
don’t think they have been dealt with adequately.
RF: Could you comment on the “global savings glut”
hypothesis and its implications for the path of the U.S.
current account?
Calvo: In general, I am sympathetic to that argument. I think
it fits the fact well. Now what could be causing it? It’s possible
that it could be a consequence of some of the crises we had in
the 1990s. In particular, those crises might have induced Asian
countries to save more, giving them the ability to finance
spending in countries like the United States. Could this situa-
tion be stable? I think it could be. I think we could go along in
this way for quite a while without there being a global crisis. My
concern is that if there were a hiccup in the financial markets,
it would not be the United States that would be most severely
hurt, as some have argued. Rather, I fear that emerging markets
would be hit hard. In the eyes of most investors, the United
States, despite its current account deficit, is still a very stable,
attractive place to put their money. If there were trouble, 
I think they would turn to the United States as a haven.
RF: How has your academic work helped you as a policy
adviser?
Calvo: I think it has been very useful. The analysis we have to
do is often very complex and there will be many things that
you will not understand fully. But I have gone back time and
again to basic macroeconomic principles to develop a frame-
work for looking at the policy questions I encounter. Also, the
work that sprang up from the rational expectations revolution
has helped me think about problems regarding credibility.
Even if I don’t take the rational expectations stories verbatim,
they provide a very simple but powerful way of understanding
how people think about the future and how to structure poli-
cy responses. You might not get every detail right, but at least
you will be working within a reasonable framework and set of
parameters. In contrast, if you do not have a strong grasp of
theory, I think you will eventually find yourself adrift.
RF: How would you compare your position now with
the Inter-American Development Bank to your 
previous job at the International Monetary Fund? 
Calvo:The two institutions are very different. For instance, the
IMF has a much larger staff of macroeconomists, and the poli-
tics of the institution were much more difficult to navigate.
Also, the events that occurred while I was at the IMF were
unique. I was there when the Soviet Union was falling apart.
This gave me a chance to travel to Eastern Europe and witness
the problems they were facing firsthand. In academia, you are
always trying to push your work to the frontiers of the field, but
when I was at the IMF I had to get back to basics and deal with
very simple but hard questions. For instance, what is the
demand for money when prices are not well-defined because of
prior across-the-board price controls as in the former Soviet
Union? Those type of issues can really focus your mind. That
said, for a number of reasons, it was hard to influence the direc-
tion of the IMF. Eventually, they did absorb some of the advice
that I gave. So the experience was ultimately mutually benefi-
cial, but it was also very tricky.
The IDB focuses on a broader set of questions. It deals with
a lot of microeconomic questions — welfare programs, poverty,
and so on — while the IMF was much more interested in pure-
ly monetary issues. Also, from a personal perspective, the
number of macroeconomists is much smaller and, as a result,
I have a much greater ability to influence the Bank’s
approach to macro issues.  RF
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